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Introduction
Robots are becoming ever more autonomous. Semi-autonomous flying robots are commercially available, and driver-less cars are undergoing real-world tests (Waldrop, 2015) . This trend towards robots with increased autonomy is ex-pected to continue (Anderson and Anderson, 2007 ). An expanding ability to take unsupervised decisions renders it imperative that mechanisms are in place to guarantee the safety of behaviour executed by the robot. The fact that many robots are designed to interact with humans further heightens the importance of equipping robots with mechanisms guaranteeing safety (Winfield, 2012; Royakkers and van Est, 2015) . For example, the state-of-the-art in robots for care, companionship, and collaborative manufacturing is rapidly advancing (Goeldner et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2011) . At the other end of the spectrum of robot-human interaction, the development of fully autonomous robots for military applications is progressing rapidly (e.g., Lin et al., 2011; Sharkey, 2008; Arkin et al., 2012; Xin and Bin, 2013) .
Robot safety is essential but not sufficient. Smart autonomous robots should be more than safe; they should also be explicitly ethical -able to both choose and justify (Moor, 2006; Anderson and Anderson, 2007) actions that prevent harm. As the cognitive, perceptual and motor capabilities of robots expand, they will be expected to have an improved capacity for moral judgment. As summarised by Picard and Picard (1997) , the greater the freedom of a machine, the more it will need moral standards.
The necessity of robots equipped with ethical capacities is recognized both in academia (e.g., Moor, 2006; Picard and Picard, 1997; Gips, 2005; Wallach and Allen, 2008; Arkin et al., 2012; Deng, 2015) and wider society, with influential figures such as Bill Gates, Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking speaking out on processes to verify whether the robotic behaviour satisfies a set of predetermined ethical constraints. This approach to ethical robots is reminiscent of Good OldFashioned AI (GOFAI) in the sense that it relies heavily on abstract symbolic reasoning (Mackworth, 2011) . Pinker (1997) argued extensively that the human mind has not evolved to be an abstract symbol manipulator. Since then, advances in cognitive science have confirmed that the computations underlying human cognition are very different from rule-based manipulation of abstract symbols (Barsalou, 2010) .
The simulation theory of cognition
This view has emerged in many domains of human cognition, including perception, reasoning and problem-solving (See Barsalou, 1999; Dijkstra and Post, 2015; Hegarty, 2004; Wilson, 2002 , for more examples). Moreover, representing, learning and combining concepts leads to some problems in purely symbolic systems (Gärdenfors, 2004; Lieto et al., 2016) . Therefore, it seems the mind uses representations that are richer than the abstract symbols allowed for in models of intelligence that presume abstract symbols.
The theory of mind that allows for the richest representations is the simulation theory of cognition (Hesslow, 2002; Wilson, 2002) . It hypothesises that thinking utilises the same cognitive (and neural) processes as interaction with the external environment. When thinking, actions are covert and are assumed to generate, via associative brain mechanisms, the sensory inputs that elicit further actions (Hesslow, 2012) . In this view, thinking requires building a grounded model of the environment -which is not composed of abstract symbols. Rather, it is assumed to re-instantiate and recombine experiences using the brain's systems of perception, action, and emotion. The mental model covertly simulates actions and their associated perceptual effects (See Hesslow, 2002 Wilson, 2002; Hegarty, 2004 , for reviews).
In this paper, we put forward a method for implementing ethical behaviour in robots inspired by the simulation theory of cognition. In contrast to existing frameworks for robot ethics, our approach does not rely on the verification of logic statements. Rather, it utilises internal simulations which allow the robot to simulate actions and predict their consequences. Therefore, our method is a form of robotic imagery. Many other areas of robotics have exploited robotic imagery. In their review of robotic imagery, Marques and Holland (2009) coined the term functional imagination to denote the mechanism whereby robots covertly simulate actions and their consequences to steer their future behaviour. Here we adopt their term. Hence, this paper aims at advancing functional imagination as a method for ethical robots.
We aim at implementing consequentialist ethics, which is implicit in the very common conception of morality, shared by many cultures and traditions (Haines, 2015) . Hence, developing an architecture suited for this class of ethics is a reasonable starting point. Moreover, the primary advantage of a functional imagination is the ability to test the outcome of potential actions (Hesslow, 2002 (Hesslow, , 2012 ) without committing to them (Marques and Holland, 2009; Ziemke et al., 2005) . Therefore, functional imagination is a framework suitable for supporting consequentialist ethics.
Architecture
Over the years, keeping track with shifts in paradigms (Murphy, 2000) , many architectures for robot controllers have been proposed (See Kortenkamp and Simmons (2008); Bekey (2005) ; Murphy (2000) for reviews). However, given the hierarchical organisation of behaviour (Botvinick, 2008) , most robotic control architectures can be remapped onto a three-layered model (Kortenkamp and Simmons, 2008) . In this model, each control level is characterised by differences in the degree of abstraction and time scale at which it operates. At the top level, the controller generates long-term goals (e.g. 'Deliver the package to room 221'). Next, goals are translated into a set of tasks that should be executed (e.g. 'Follow corridor', 'Open door', etc.). Finally, the tasks are translated into (sensori)motor actions that can be executed by the robot (e.g. 'Raise arm to doorknob' and 'Turn wrist joint'). Obviously, this general characterization ignores many particulars of individual control architectures.
Assuming that the robot is controlled by a three-layered controller ( fig. 1a ), we agree with Arkin (2012; that ethical behaviour should be governed by adding a fourth specialised control layer. This Ethical Layer ( fig. 1b) should act as a governor evaluating behaviour proposed by each of the three other layers before the robot executes it. In principle, the functionality of the Ethical Layer could be distributed across and integrated with the layers present in existing control architectures. Indeed, in humans, ethical decision making is most likely supported by the same computational machinery as decision making in other domains (Young and Dungan, 2012) . Nevertheless, from an engineering point of view, guaranteeing the ethical behaviour of the robot through a separate layer has several advantages (Arkin et al., 2012; Arkin, 2008) . For one, by implementing the ethical layer as a just-in-time checker of behaviour, it can act as a fail safe device checking behaviour before execution. Also, a separate Ethical Layer implies its functionality can be scrutinised independently from the operation of the robot controller. The behaviour enforced or prohibited by the Ethical Layer can be checked and (formally) verified (Dennis et al., 2015) . When modelling reasoning and strategy switching in humans, Donoso et al. (2014) found that assuming humans evaluate no more than two or three alternative strategies resulted in the best model fit. This suggests that humans consider only a few behavioural options -at least without interrupting the ongoing behaviour and resorting to longer reflection (Kahneman, 2011) . The restricted number of behavioural alternatives people consider is probably due to limits in cognitive capacity, e.g., working memory. Thus, experimental evidence indicates that implementing ethical behaviour on a robot should require only a small number of behavioural alternatives to be generated and evaluated. Evaluating a limited number of behavioural alternatives would improve the responsiveness of the robots and prevent the Ethical Layer from introducing delays.
The Simulation Module
Cognitive research has focused mostly on demonstrating the involvement of mental simulations in cognition. Much less work has been done to unravel the computational operations underlying simulation and how the results of simulations are used (Barsalou, 2010; Marques and Holland, 2009 ). Indeed, simulating behaviour and its outcome is far from trivial. Nevertheless, in the field of cognitive science authors typically take the ability to simulate for granted and assume some underspecified processes underlying them (e.g., Zwaan, 2003) . Hence, in this paper, the structure of the simulation module we put forward is based on an analysis of the requirements rather than on findings in cognitive science (See also Marques and Holland, 2009 , and the discussion therein). We suggest that the Simulation Module needs to be equipped with (1) Including a model of the human (or several humans), the Simulation Module can predict the future sensory and motor states of the human(s) (e.g., Vaughan and Gerkey, 2007; Marques and Holland, 2009 ). However, also internal states, including emotions, can be simulated. Indeed, the ability to make these rich predictions is what the mental simulation theory of cognition asserts (See Hesslow, 2012; Kosslyn et al., 2001 , for references). Indeed, mental simulation has been suggested to underlie empathy and the understanding of other's emotions (Shanton and Goldman, 2010; Gallese et al., 2004) . In humans, the same neural machinery that supports action and perception during overt behaviour supports the mental simulations of sensory and internal states (Hesslow, 2012 (Hesslow, , 2002 Kortenkamp and Simmons, 2008; Gallese et al., 2004; Shanton and Goldman, 2010) . However, in robots, this will have to be supported by a sufficiently complex model of the human. In agreement with findings in cognitive science, we suggest that the simulated emotional states or the emotions associated with the sensory states are evaluated to assess the desirability of an action, at least when acting under time pressure (Kahneman, 2011) .
Implementing a sufficiently elaborate model of the human is potentially the most challenging component of the Ethical Layer. However, practically speaking, it should be possible to devise a model of the human that is compatible with the limited degrees of freedom and restricted application domains of current robots. Indeed, the complexity of the human model only needs to match the robot's complexity and domain of application. We believe it should be possible to devise human models for currently realisable agents with limited application domains, e.g. driver-less cars, personal assistants or military robots. As an example of a domain-specific human model used by a robot, Kato et al. (2015) developed a model that allows robotic shopping assistants to predict when to approach a customer. In related work, Nigam and Riek (2015) succeeded in training a robot to recognise when it was acceptable to approach people in different social settings. RIBA, a nursing-care assistant robot uses a model of the human body to estimate a person's comfort while lifting her from the bed (Ding et al., 2012) . As a final example, the area of human-aware robot navigation seeks to equip robots will models of humans that allow them to navigate the same space without violating social rules (Kruse et al., 2013) .
The Evaluation Module
The Evaluation Module combines the simulated outcomes, for both the robot and human, into a single metric reflecting the desirability of a given behavioural alternative. The way in which the Evaluation Module collapses the multidimensional simulation results into a single unidimensional value determines which ethical rules it implements.
How to select the ethical rules a robot should follow is currently largely an outstanding problem and various authors have suggested multiple approaches (See Allen et al., 2005 , for a review). Although no consensus has been reached, even in simple scenarios (Anderson and Anderson, 2010) , we need to put forward a definition of ethical behaviour against which the behavior can be evaluated, at least, in the context of our experiments. Asimov (1950) is the earliest, and probably best known, author to put forward a set of ethical rules governing robot behaviour (List 1). At first sight, implementing rules derived from a work of fiction might seem an inappropriate starting point. However, in contrast, to general consequentialist ethical frameworks, such as Utilitarianism, Asimov's Laws explicitly govern the behaviour of robots and their interaction with humans.
Several authors have argued against using Asimov's laws for governing robotic behaviour (Murphy and Woods, 2009; Anderson and Anderson, 2007) . List 1 Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics (Asimov, 1950) .
1: A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2: A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3: A robot must protect its existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.
Methods

Experimental Setup
We used two NAO humanoid robots (Aldebaran) in this study, a blue and a red version. In all experiments, we used the red robot as a proxy for a human.
We equipped the blue robot with the Ethical Layer. In previous work (Winfield et al., 2014) , we referred to the robot acting as a proxy for the human as the H-robot (short for Human robot). The robot equipped with ethical behaviour was denoted as the A-robot (short for Asimovian robot). In this paper, we adopt the same nomenclature, and from now on, we will refer to the blue robot as the A-robot and the red robot as the H-robot. All experiments were carried out in a 3 by 2.5 meter arena. An overhead tracking system consisting of 4 cameras was used to monitor the position and orientation of the robots at a rate of 30 Hz. We equipped the robots with a clip-on helmet featuring reflective beads. The tracking system utilised these to localise the robots. The arena also contained two small tables, which marked two goal positions for the robots.
These tables had a unique pattern of reflective beads on their tops. We refer to these locations as positions A and B in the remainder of the paper. The sites of these targets in the arena did not change. However, the valence of the locations varied. One of the locations was designated as being dangerous (see below).
Every trial in the experiments started with the H-robot and the A-robot going to predefined start positions in the arena. Next, both could be issued a default goal location to which to go. Asimov's Laws stipulate that robots should obey commands issued by a human. Hence, the H-robot could give the A-robot a command at the beginning of each experimental trial. We implemented this 
The Ethical Layer
The Ethical Layer monitored the behaviour of the A-robot. As described above, the Ethical Layer consisted of the Simulation Module that simulated the outcomes for both A-robot and H-robot for each prospective action. The Evaluation Module combined these predictions into a single measure of desirability.
In the following paragraphs, we describe the current implementation of the two modules. The functionality of the Ethical Layer as implemented in this paper is also illustrated in figure 2.
Behavioral alternatives
The robot controller was assumed to generate a set of behavioural alternatives for the A-robot. The robot controller inferred the goal of the H-robot (figure 2a). Inferring the goal was done by calculating the angle between the gaze direction of the H-robot and the relative position of both potential goal locations A and B. The location which returned the smallest angle was taken to be the goal location of the H-robot. Once the goal location is determined, a set of alternative goals (positions in the arena) were generated (figure 2b). The set of alternatives included (1) both target locations A and B and (2) three positions along the simulated path for the H-robot. If the H-robot was not detected to be moving (i.e., the velocity as given by the tracking system is lower than 0.05 ms −1 ) the generation module only returned the two goal locations A and B as behavioural alternatives. The behavioural alternatives were sent to the Ethical Layer to be evaluated.
The Simulation Module
For every behavioural alternative, its outcome was predicted using the Simulation Module. The operation of the Simulation Module is illustrated in figure   2c . The robot's model of the human incorporated the following four assumptions about the human: (1) The H-robot moves in a straight line to its goal. (2) The safety of the H-robot depends on its distance from the dangerous location. (3) The H-robot will stop when closer than 0.5 m to the A-robot. (4) The H-robot prefers its orders to be followed.
As shown in figure 1 , the Simulation Module also contains a model of the robot. In this paper, the A-robot simulated its own behaviour based on the following three assumptions: (1) The A-robot moves in a straight line to its goal. (2) The closer the A-robot comes to a dangerous location, the less safe it is. (3) The A-robot stops when closer than 0.5 meters from the H-robot.
Using the estimated speed of the H-robot and the A-robot, the paths of both agents were extrapolated. We also simulated the obstacle avoidance process running on both agents. If the paths of the robots were simulated to come within 0.5 m of each other, it was simulated they would stop. Hence, in this case, the final positions of the agents were simulated to be the positions at which obstacle avoidance would stop them. If the paths were simulated not to come within 0.5 m from each other, the final positions of the agents were taken to be the final destination of the paths.
Finally, the Simulation Module simulated two outcome states for the H-robot (Figure 2d ). First, the safety level of the H-robot I h1,i was given by,
with d h,i the simulated final distance between the H-robot and the dangerous position for prospective action i. This final distance is given by the outcome of the Simulation Module. The parameters β and t determine the shape of the sigmoid function and were set to 10 and 0.25 respectively (see figure 3) . These values were chosen arbitrarily and other values result in qualitatively similar results.
A second simulated state for the human, I h2,i , depended on whether the Arobot executed an order given by the H-robot. This state I h2,i takes the value 1 if the robot executes a given order and -1 it disregards the order. If no order is given, the parameter I h2,i takes the value of 0. Hence, the states I h1,i and I h2,i incorporate the assumptions listed above, taking into account both the danger and whether a given order was executed by the A-robot.
Likewise, the Simulation Module generated an outcome state I e,i describing the robots exposure to the risk associated with the dangerous location ( figure   2d ) when the A-robot would execute behavioural alternative i,
with d e,i the final distance between the A-robot and the dangerous position (using the same values for β and t) as simulated for prospective action i.
The Evaluation Module
The Evaluation Module combines the simulated states of the human and the robot into a single metric. The desirability D i of an action i is given by, 
Results
Demonstrating that the A-robot adheres to Asimov's laws requires • demonstrating Law 3, i.e., that the robot can act to self-preserve if (and only if) this does not conflict with obedience or human safety, and,
• demonstrating that Law 2 takes priority over Law 3, i.e., the robot should obey a human, even if this compromises its safety,
• demonstrating that Law 1 takes precedence over Law 3, i.e., the robot should safeguard a human, even if this compromises its safety,
• demonstrating that Law 1 takes precedence over Law 2, i.e., the robot should safeguard a human, even if this implies disobeying an order.
The series of experiments reported below was designed to test these requirements. All results reported below are obtained using the same code. Only the default goals of the robots and the valence of targets A and B were varied. All data reported in this paper are available from the Zenodo research data repository. [Data will be uploaded to Zenodo.org, and a DOI will be provided upon acceptance of the paper]. Plots were generated using Matplotlib (Hunter, 2007) .
Experiment 1: Self-Preservation
The first experiment presents a situation in which the A-robot is initiated with location B as a target. This position is designated as a dangerous place. The H-robot does not move from its default position and issues no command.
Under these circumstances, the H-robot will not come to harm, and the A-robot can preserve its integrity without disobeying a command. Hence, in agreement with Law 3, the Ethical Layer should override the default goal of the robot and send it to the safe goal position (i.e., position B). 
Experiment 2: Obedience
The second experiment is identical to experiment 1 but for the H-robot issuing a command to the robot. The H-robot orders the A-robot to go to dangerous position B. Throughout the experiment, the H-robot stays at the default posi- I e,i that is gained from disregarding the order, and staying safe.
Experiment 3: Human Safety
In experiment 3, the H-robot moves to location A. The A-robot starts by going to location B. Location A is the dangerous position ( Figure 6 ). Because location A is dangerous, the Ethical Layer should detect the imminent danger for the H-robot and prevent it (Law 1). Importantly, to prevent the H-robot from reaching the hazardous location, the A-robot needs to approach this location because the A-robot can only stop the H-robot by intercepting it. Hence, A-robot stops the H-robot despite this leading to a lower safety value for I e,i (i.e., some harm to the A-robot). Indeed, the A-robot approaches the dangerous position more closely than the H-robot. 
Experiment 4: Human Safety and Obedience
Experiment 4 is identical to experiment 3 but for the H-robot issuing a command at the start of each trial. The A-robot is ordered by the H-robot to go to position B. Location A is set as dangerous. Therefore, the Ethical Layer should detect the imminent danger for the H-robot and prevent it. However, this conflicts with the issued command. Nevertheless, as the preservation of the H-robot's safety takes priority over obedience, the robot should stop the H-robot (Law 1 overrides Law 2). Once the H-robot stops, the danger is averted. The A-robot should then proceed to carry out the order to go to location B (Law 2). This behaviour is shown in figure 7.
Discussion
The impact of the current work is two-fold. First, it represents an addition to the very limited body of work on Ethical Robots. Most work on ethical robots has been done in simulation. To the best of our knowledge, only Anderson and Anderson (2010) and Winfield et al. (2014) have implemented ethical behaviour with preventing the H-robot coming to harm. Once, the H-robot has been prevented from coming to harm, the A-robot executes the given order.
on physical robots. As such, the current paper provides an additional proof of concept of the idea that robots can be programmed to behave ethically.
Secondly, and most important, our paper presents an alternative to the logicbased A.I. that currently dominates the field. We speculate that a simulation based approach, inspired by findings in cognitive science, could be an alternative (or additional) framework for implementing robotic ethics. Indeed, using the terminology of Marques and Holland (2009) , this paper advances the use of functional imagination as a method for ethical robots.
In other areas of robotics, functional imagination has been employed as a way of dealing with the limitations of logic-based reasoning (Marques and Holland, 2009; Ziemke et al., 2005; Winfield, 2014) . We believe that, currently, the field of ethical robots is too young to dismiss any of the possible methods that might be used to endow robots with morality (see Mackworth (2011) for yet another method based on Dynamic Constraint Satisfaction). Hence, we explicitly offer our approach as an additional method rather than an alternative to logic frameworks.
Our approach to ethical robots is part of the emerging trend to use functional imagination (Marques and Holland, 2009 ) to support various cognitive and sensorimotor functions in robots. Mental simulation has been suggested a method for increasing robots' resilience to failure (Bongard et al., 2006) , enhance mo-tor coordination (Vaughan and Zuluga, 2006) , support self-awareness (Winfield, 2014) and artificial consciousness (Holland, 2007) and imitation (Demiris and Johnson, 2006) .
So far, cognitive science has not elucidated the computational processes underlying cognitive simulation in humans. As such, researchers in robotics wanting to emulate this functionality have to resort to ad hoc architectures based on an analysis of the problem. Marques and Holland (2009) presented an extensive analysis and overview of the computational requirements for implementing functional imagination in robots. While our simulation module was constructed in an ad hoc fashion, it satisfies the requirements for functional imagination as outlined by these authors. First, the simulation module allows the A-robot to predict and represent counterfactual realities and sensory states. Also, the simulation results are evaluated using the simulated outcome states. The Arobot is also capable of simulating multiple alternative actions. Therefore, we conclude that our simulation module constitutes a functional (albeit minimal)
form of robotic functional imagination.
